banner



Home  ›  Coup D'etats Are Most Often

Coup D'etats Are Most Often

Written By Monday, October 31, 2022 Add Comment Edit

Degradation of a government

A coup d'état (; French for 'stroke of land'),[ane] too known every bit a coup or overthrow, is a seizure and removal of a government and its powers.[2] [three] Typically, it is an illegal seizure of power by a political faction, politician, cult, insubordinate grouping, armed services, or a dictator.[4] [five] Many scholars consider a coup successful when the usurpers seize and concur power for at least seven days.[4]

Etymology [edit]

The term comes from French coup d'état, literally meaning a 'stroke of country' or 'accident of land'.[six] [7] [8] In French, the word État (French: [eta]) is capitalized when information technology denotes a sovereign political entity.[9]

Although the concept of a coup d'état has featured in politics since antiquity, the phrase is of relatively recent coinage.[10] Information technology did not appear within an English text before the 19th century except when used in the translation of a French source, there being no simple phrase in English to convey the contextualized thought of a 'knockout accident to the existing administration inside a country'.

Ane early utilize within text translated from French was in 1785 in a printed translation of a letter of the alphabet from a French merchant, commenting on an arbitrary decree or arrêt issued by the French rex restricting the import of British wool.[11] What may be its first published use within a text composed in English is an editor'south note in the London Morning Relate, January 7, 1802, reporting the abort by Napoleon in French republic, of Moreau, Berthier, Masséna, and Bernadotte: "There was a report in apportionment yesterday of a sort of coup d'état having taken place in France, in upshot of some formidable conspiracy confronting the existing government."

In the British printing, the phrase came to be used to describe the various murders by Napoleon's alleged secret police, the Gens d'Armes d'Elite, who executed the Duke of Enghien: "the actors in torture, the distributors of the poisoning draughts, and the secret executioners of those unfortunate individuals or families, whom Bonaparte's measures of safe require to remove. In what revolutionary tyrants phone call yard[s] coups d'état, as butchering, or poisoning, or drowning, en masse, they are exclusively employed."[12]

[edit]

Self coup [edit]

A self-coup, also called autocoup (from the Spanish: autogolpe), is a class of coup d'état in which a nation'due south caput, having come to power through legal means, tries to stay in power through illegal means. The leader may dissolve or render powerless the national legislature and unlawfully assume boggling powers not granted under normal circumstances. Other measures may include annulling the nation'southward constitution, suspending civil courts, and having the caput of government assume dictatorial powers.[13] [14]

Between 1946 and 2020, an estimated 148 self-coup attempts have taken place: 110 in autocracies and 38 in democracies.[15]

Soft insurrection [edit]

A soft coup, sometimes referred to as a silent coup or a bloodless coup, is an illegal overthrow of a government, simply unlike a classical coup d'état information technology is accomplished without the use of forcefulness or violence.[16]

Palace insurrection [edit]

A palace insurrection or palace revolution is a coup in which one faction inside the ruling group displaces another faction within a ruling grouping.[17] Along with popular protests, palace coups are a major threat to dictators.[eighteen] The Harem conspiracy of the 12th century BC was one of the earliest. Palace coups were common in Regal China.[19] They take besides occurred amid the Habsburg dynasty in Austria, the Al-Thani dynasty in Qatar,[20] and in Haiti in the 19th to early 20th centuries.[21] The majority of Russian tsars betwixt 1725 and 1801 were either overthrown or usurped power in palace coups.[22]

Putsch [edit]

The term Putsch ([pʊtʃ], from Swiss-German 'knock'), denotes the political-armed forces actions of an unsuccessful minority reactionary coup.[23] [24] The term was initially coined for the Züriputsch of 6 September 1839 in Switzerland. Information technology was likewise used for attempted coups in Weimar Federal republic of germany, such every bit the 1920 Kapp Coup d'état, Küstrin Coup d'état, and the 1923 Beer Hall Coup d'état by Adolf Hitler.[25]

During the Dark of the Long Knives in 1934, a supposed putsch was the underpinning of a disinformation tactic past Hitler and other Nazi party members. Subsequently initiating a purge, the idea of an imminent coup allowed them to falsely claim the killing was justified (equally a means to suppress an insurgence). Germans still apply the term Röhm-Putsch to describe the consequence, the term given to it by the Nazi regime, despite the unproven implication that the murders were necessary to forbid a reactionary coup. Thus, German authors ofttimes use quotation marks or write nigh the sogenannter Röhm-Putsch ('so-called Röhm Putsch') for accent.[26]

The 1961 Algiers Putsch and the 1991 Baronial Putsch as well use the term.

Pronunciamiento [edit]

Pronunciamiento ("pronouncement") is a term of Castilian origin for a blazon of insurrection d'état . The pronunciamiento is the formal caption for deposing the regnant government, justifying the installation of the new regime that was affected by the golpe de estado . A "barracks revolt" or cuartelazo is besides a term for military revolt, from the Castilian term cuartel ('quarter' or 'barracks'). Specific armed forces garrisons are the sparking cistron for a larger military revolt against the government.[27]

I author makes a distinction between a insurrection and a pronunciamiento . In a coup, it is the war machine, paramilitary, or opposing political faction that deposes the current government and assumes power; whereas, in the pronunciamiento , the military deposes the existing authorities and installs an ostensibly noncombatant government.[28]

Other [edit]

Other types of bodily or attempted unilateral seizures of ability are sometimes called "coups with adjectives." The appropriate term can be subjective and carries normative, belittling, and political implications.[16]

  • Ceremonious social club coup
  • Constitutional insurrection
  • Democratic coup
  • Electoral coup
  • Judicial coup
  • Market insurrection
  • War machine coup
  • Parliamentary coup
  • Presidential coup
  • Royal insurrection, in which a monarch dismisses democratically elected leaders and seizes all power;[29] for example the vi January Dictatorship
  • Slow-motion coup
  • Slow-moving coup
  • Deadening-rolling coup

Revolution, rebellion [edit]

A revolution or rebellion can accept the aforementioned outcome as a insurrection, in that a ruler or government tin can be replaced by unconstitutional ways. Still, while a coup is usually made by a pocket-size group and planned beforehand, a revolution or rebellion is normally started more than spontaneously and by larger groups of uncoordinated people.[30] The distinction is not always articulate. Sometimes, a coup is besides labelled every bit a revolution by the coup makers to try to requite it a form of democratic legitimacy.[31] [32]

Prevalence and history [edit]

According to Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell's coup data set, there were 457 insurrection attempts from 1950 to 2010, of which 227 (49.vii%) were successful and 230 (50.three%) were unsuccessful.[4] They find that coups take "been nigh mutual in Africa and the Americas (36.v% and 31.9%, respectively). Asia and the Center Eastward have experienced 13.1% and fifteen.8% of full global coups, respectively. Europe has experienced by far the fewest coup attempts: 2.vi%."[4] Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, just in that location were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.[4] From 1950 to 2010, a majority of coups failed in the Middle Eastward and Latin America. They had a somewhat college chance of success in Africa and Asia.[33] Numbers of successful coups have decreased over time.[4]

Outcomes [edit]

Successful coups are 1 method of government change that thwarts the peaceful transition of power.[34] [5] A 2016 study categorizes four possible outcomes to coups in dictatorships:[35]

  • Failed insurrection
  • No regime alter, such as when a leader is illegally shuffled out of power without changing the identity of the group in power or the rules for governing
  • Replacement of incumbent with another dictatorship
  • Ousting of the dictatorship followed past democratization (also chosen "autonomous coups")[36]

The report found that about half of all coups in dictatorships—both during and after the Cold War—install new autocratic regimes.[35] New dictatorships launched by coups engage in college levels of repression in the year that follows the insurrection than existed in the yr leading to the coup.[35] One-third of coups in dictatorships during the Common cold War and 10% of later ones reshuffled the regime leadership.[35] Democracies were installed in the wake of 12% of Common cold War coups in dictatorships and forty% of post-Common cold State of war ones.[35]

Coups occurring in the post-Cold War flow have been more likely to result in democratic systems than pre-Cold War coups,[37] [35] [38] though coups still by and large perpetuate authoritarianism.[33] Coups that occur during civil wars shorten the war's duration.[39]

Predictors [edit]

A 2003 review of the bookish literature establish that the following factors were associated with coups:

  • officers' personal grievances
  • military organizational grievances
  • military popularity
  • military attitudinal cohesiveness
  • economic decline
  • domestic political crisis
  • contagion from other regional coups
  • external threat
  • participation in state of war
  • collusion with a foreign military power
  • war machine's national security doctrine
  • officers' political culture
  • noninclusive institutions
  • colonial legacy
  • economical evolution
  • undiversified exports
  • officers' class limerick
  • war machine size
  • force of civil society
  • regime legitimacy and by coups.[40] [41]

The literature review in a 2016 report includes mentions of ethnic factionalism, supportive foreign governments, leader inexperience, slow growth, commodity cost shocks, and poverty.[42]

Coups accept been found to appear in environments that are heavily influenced by armed forces powers. Multiple of the above factors are connected to military civilization and power dynamics. These factors tin can be divided into multiple categories, with two of these categories existence a threat to military interests and support for military interests. If interests get in either management, the military machine will find itself either capitalizing off that ability or attempting to gain it dorsum.

Often times armed forces spending is a indicator of the likelihood of a coup taking place Nordvik plant that most 75% of coups that took place in many dissimilar countries rooted from military spending and oil windfalls.[twoscore]

Coup trap [edit]

The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups.[41] [43] [44] This phenomenon is chosen the insurrection trap.[44] [45] A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open up political contest helps bring countries out of the "insurrection trap" and reduces cycles of political instability.[45]

Regime blazon and polarization [edit]

Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to coups than are very authoritarian states or democratic states.[46] A 2021 study establish that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.[47] A 2015 report finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.[48] A 2016 study finds that in that location is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke tearing resistance from military officers."[49] Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease coordination obstacles amidst coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.[50] A third 2016 study finds that coups become more probable in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.[51] A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.[52] A 5th 2016 report finds no show that coups are contagious; one coup in a region does non brand other coups in the region likely to follow.[53] One written report found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination bug for coup-plotters.[54]

A 2019 report establish that when noncombatant elites are polarized and balloter competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.[55]

In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.[56] [57] [58]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence insurrection frequency.[45]

Territorial disputes, internal conflicts, and armed conflicts [edit]

A 2017 study found that autocratic leaders whose states were involved in international rivalries over disputed territory were more likely to be overthrown in a coup. The authors of the study provide the post-obit logic for why this is: "Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial rivalries need to strengthen the military in guild to compete with a foreign adversary. The imperative of developing a strong regular army puts dictators in a paradoxical situation: to compete with a rival state, they must empower the very agency—the military—that is almost likely to threaten their own survival in office."[59] However, two 2016 studies plant that leaders who were involved in militarized confrontations and conflicts were less likely to face up a insurrection.[60] [61]

A 2019 study plant that states that had recently signed civil state of war peace agreements were much more likely to feel coups, in detail when those agreements independent provisions that jeopardized the interests of the military.[62]

Popular opposition and regional rebellions [edit]

Inquiry suggests that protests spur coups, as they help elites within the country apparatus to coordinate coups.[63]

A 2019 written report institute that regional rebellions fabricated coups by the war machine more likely.[64]

Effect of the military [edit]

A 2018 report found that coup attempts were less likely in states where the militaries derived significant incomes from peacekeeping missions.[65] The report argued that militaries were dissuaded from staging coups because they feared that the UN would no longer enlist the armed forces in peacekeeping missions.[65]

A separate 2018 written report found that the presence of military academies were linked to coups. The authors fence that armed forces academies make it easier for military officers to programme coups, as the schools build networks among military officers.[66]

Economy, development, and resources factors [edit]

A 2018 study found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries."[67] The study argues that states which accept onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not practice that for offshore oil wealth.[67]

A 2020 study plant that elections had a two-sided touch on coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy. During periods of economical expansion, elections reduced the likelihood of coup attempts, whereas elections during economic crises increased the likelihood of insurrection attempts.[68]

A 2021 study institute that oil wealthy nations see a pronounced gamble of coup attempts but these coups are unlikely to succeed.[69]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th century study found that coup frequency does not vary with evolution levels, economic inequality, or the rate of economic growth.[45]

Insurrection-proofing [edit]

In what is referred to as "coup-proofing," regimes create structures that make it hard for whatever modest group to seize ability. These insurrection-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, indigenous, and religious groups in the military machine; cosmos of an armed forcefulness parallel to the regular military; and evolution of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor ane another.[70] It may also involve frequent salary hikes and promotions for members of the military,[71] and the deliberate use of diverse bureaucrats.[72] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the adventure of coups occurring.[73] [74] However, coup-proofing reduces armed services effectiveness,[75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.[81] One reason why authoritarian governments tend to have incompetent militaries is that authoritarian regimes fright that their armed forces will stage a insurrection or allow a domestic insurgence to proceed uninterrupted – every bit a consequence, authoritarian rulers accept incentives to place incompetent loyalists in key positions in the armed services.[82]

A 2016 written report shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.[83] Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who accept more to gain by patience than past plotting.[83]

According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.[84] A 2017 written report finds that countries' insurrection-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.[85] Coup-proofing is more likely in one-time French colonies.[86]

A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond past purging known and potential rivals are likely to take longer tenures as leaders.[87] A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors fence that this is because "personalists are characterized past weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler."[88]

Impact [edit]

Democracy [edit]

Research suggests that coups promoting democratization in staunchly authoritarian regimes take go less likely to end in commonwealth over time, and that the positive influence has strengthened since the finish of the Cold State of war.[37] [35] [89] [90] [91]

A 2014 study establish that "coups promote democratization, particularly among states that are least probable to democratize otherwise".[89] The authors argue that coup attempts can take this consequence because leaders of successful coups have incentives to democratize speedily in lodge to establish political legitimacy and economical growth, while leaders who stay in power after failed coup attempts see it as a sign that they must enact meaningful reforms to remain in ability.[89] A 2014 study found that 40% of post-Cold War coups were successful. The authors contend that this may be due to the incentives created by international pressure.[37] A 2016 study found that democracies were installed in 12% of Cold War coups and 40% of the post-Cold War coups.[35] A 2020 study institute that coups tended to lead to increases in state repression, not reductions.[92]

According to a 2020 report, "external reactions to coups play important roles in whether insurrection leaders movement toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external autonomous actors, insurrection leaders take an incentive to push for elections to retain external back up and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival."[93]

According to legal scholar Ilya Somin a insurrection to forcibly overthrow autonomous government might be sometimes justified. Commenting on the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, Somin opined,

There should be a stiff presumption against forcibly removing a autonomous government. Just that presumption might be overcome if the authorities in question poses a grave threat to man rights, or is probable to destroy democracy itself by shutting downwards future political competition.[94]

Repression and counter-coups [edit]

According to Naunihal Singh, author of Seizing Ability: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (2014), it is "fairly rare" for the prevailing existing government to violently purge the army after a coup has been foiled. If it starts the mass killing of elements of the army, including officers who were not involved in the coup, this may trigger a "counter-insurrection" by soldiers who are agape they volition exist side by side. To prevent such a desperate counter-coup that may be more successful than the initial try, governments normally resort to firing prominent officers and replacing them with loyalists instead.[95]

Some research suggests that increased repression and violence typically follow both successful and unsuccessful coup attempts.[96] However, some tentative assay by political scientist Jay Ulfelder finds no clear design of deterioration in homo rights practices in wake of failed coups in post-Common cold War era.[97]

Notable counter-coups include the Ottoman countercoup of 1909, the 1960 Laotian counter-coup, the Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66, the 1966 Nigerian counter-coup, the 1967 Greek counter-coup, 1971 Sudanese counter-coup, and the Putsch of December Twelfth in South Korea.

A 2017 study finds that the employ of land broadcasting by the putschist regime after Mali'southward 2012 coup did not elevate explicit blessing for the authorities.[98]

Co-ordinate to a 2019 report, coup attempts lead to a reduction in physical integrity rights.[99]

International response [edit]

The international customs tends to react adversely to coups by reducing aid and imposing sanctions. A 2015 written report finds that "coups confronting democracies, coups after the Cold State of war, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction."[100] Some other 2015 report shows that coups are the strongest predictor for the imposition of democratic sanctions.[101] A 3rd 2015 study finds that Western states react strongest against coups of possible autonomous and man rights abuses.[101] A 2016 written report shows that the international donor community in the mail service-Cold War flow penalizes coups past reducing strange aid.[102] The US has been inconsistent in applying aid sanctions against coups both during the Cold War and post-Common cold State of war periods, a likely consequence of its geopolitical interests.[102]

Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) accept adopted anti-coup frameworks. Through the threat of sanctions, the organizations actively try to curb coups. A 2016 report finds that the AU has played a meaningful role in reducing African coups.[103]

A 2017 study found that negative international responses, especially from powerful actors, have a meaning issue in shortening the duration of regimes created in coups.[104]

According to a 2020 study, coups increment the cost of borrowing and increase the likelihood of sovereign default.[105]

Current leaders who assumed power via coups [edit]

  1. ^ Nabiyev was forced to resign by government militia on 7 September 1992, with Emomali Rahmon assumed interim power in Nov.[106]
  2. ^ De facto Prime number Minister at that time, just under courtroom lodge to resign.
  3. ^ Hadi was forced to resign past Houthi rebels on 22 January 2015, but after renounced his resignation. The coup culminated into a ceremonious war.
  4. ^ Mugabe resigned on 21 November 2017.
  5. ^ Prime Government minister, Head of Government (under Tunisian Constitution, Shared Executive Power), Kais Saied Also Abolished the Parliament, which represents the Legislative Power in a representative Democracy)
  6. ^ "Constitutional" Insurrection, By Activation of Article 80 (total Ability Seizure in case of "Imminent Danger", which is not well-divers, as there is a conflict of interest if the president is the sole arbiter of defining "Danger", and there is no judicial reconciliation (Ex. Constitutional/Supreme Court), Kais Saied removed Head of Authorities and Parliament

Encounter also [edit]

  • Assassination
  • Civilian-based defense
  • Civil-military relations
  • Civilian command of the military
  • Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook
  • Coup de main
  • Kleptocracy
  • Leadership spill
  • List of protective service agencies
  • Military dictatorship
  • Political corruption
  • Political warfare
  • Demolition
  • Self-coup
  • Vii Days in May
  • Soft insurrection
  • Land collapse
  • Succession crisis
  • Listing of coups and coup attempts past country
  • List of coups and insurrection attempts
  • List of coups and insurrection attempts since 2010

References [edit]

  1. ^ "coup d'état". Merriam-Webster. Merriam-Webster. Retrieved four April 2022.
  2. ^ Robertson, David. The Routledge Dictiinary and of Politics, p. 125 (Taylor and Francis, 3d Edition, 2004): "Coup d'etat describes the sudden and violent overthrow of a government, almost invariably by the armed services or with the help of the military."
  3. ^ Brown, Garrett et al. A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations (iv ed., Oxford University Press, 2018): "The sudden, forcible, and illegal removal of a regime, normally past the military or some role thereof, often precipitated by more immediate grievances bearing straight on the military."
  4. ^ a b c d east f Powell, Jonathan Grand.; Thyne, Clayton L. (1 March 2011). "Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010 A new dataset" (PDF). Journal of Peace Research (Preprint). 48 (2): 249–259. doi:10.1177/0022343310397436. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 9066792. Retrieved 20 June 2022. Coups may be undertaken by whatsoever elite who is part of the land apparatus. These tin include non-civilian members of the military and security services, or noncombatant members of regime.
  5. ^ a b Przeworski, Adam (January 2015). "Acquiring the Habit of Changing Governments Through Elections". Comparative Political Studies. 48 (1): 101–129. doi:10.1177/0010414014543614. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 154441890. an entire sequence of elections may occur peacefully, with or without alternations, so some exogenous event may lead to a coup, usurpation of power by the current incumbent, ceremonious war, or another constitutional irregularity.
  6. ^ "Coup d'état". Oxford Dictionaries. Archived from the original on vi November 2015. Retrieved 12 January 2019.
  7. ^ "Putsch". Merriam Webster.
  8. ^ "Turkey Insurrection". Merriam Webster. xv July 2016. Retrieved 5 February 2021.
  9. ^ "Banque de dépannage linguistique – état". Office québécois de la langue française. Archived from the original on 1 July 2012. Retrieved 12 Dec 2012.
  10. ^ Julius Caesar'south civil war, 5 January 49 BC.
  11. ^ Norfolk Relate, 13 August 1785: "It is thought hither past some, that it is a Coup d'Etat played off as a prelude to a disagreeable after-piece. But I can confidently clinch you, that the to a higher place-mentioned arret was promulgated in consequence of innumerable complaints and murmurs which have establish their manner to the ears of the Sovereign. Our merchants contend, that they experience the greatest difficulties in trading with the English".
  12. ^ "unk". Kentish Gazette. Canterbury. sixteen October 1804. p. ii.
  13. ^ An early reference to the term autogolpe may be found in Kaufman, Edy: Uruguay in Transition: From Civilian to Military Dominion, Transaction, New Brunswick, 1979. It includes a definition of autogolpe and mentions that the word was "popularly" used in reference to events in Uruguay in 1972–1973. Run into Uruguay in Transition: From Civilian to Military Rule – Edy Kaufman at Google Books.
  14. ^ Tufekci, Zeynep (seven December 2020). "'This Must Be Your Offset'". The Atlantic. In political scientific discipline, the term insurrection refers to the illegitimate overthrow of a sitting government—ordinarily through violence or the threat of violence. The technical term for attempting to stay in ability illegitimately—such as after losing an election—is self-coup or autocoup, sometimes autogolpe
  15. ^ Nakamura, David (5 January 2021). "With brazen assault on ballot, Trump prompts critics to warn of a coup". Washington Post . Retrieved 5 January 2021.
  16. ^ a b Marsteintredet, Leiv and Malamud, Andrés. "Coup with Adjectives: Conceptual Stretching or Innovation in Comparative Research", Political Studies Vol. 68(4) 1014–1035 (2020).
  17. ^ Peterson, Thousand.J. (2019). "Recognition of governments". Routledge Handbook of Land Recognition. pp. 205–219. doi:10.4324/9781351131759-16. ISBN978-1351131759. S2CID 243704806.
  18. ^ Raphael Boleslavsky, Mehdi Shadmehr & Konstantin Sonin, Media Freedom in the Shadow of a Coup, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 19, Issue iii, June 2021, pp. 1782–1815.
  19. ^ Anita M. Andrew & John A. Rapp, Autocracy and People's republic of china's Rebel Founding Emperors: Comparison Chairman Mao and Ming Taizu (Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 324; Charles O. Hucker, Prc'south Purple By: An Introduction to Chinese History and Civilisation (Stanford University Printing: 1975), p. 304.
  20. ^ Patrick Milton, Michael Axworthy & Brendan Simms, Towards A Westphalia for the Middle East (Oxford University Printing, 2019), p. 104.
  21. ^ Mats Lundahl, Politics Or Markets? Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment (Routledge, 2002), p. 321.
  22. ^ Lorenz Erren, Feofan Prokopovich's Pravda voli monarshei as Fundamental Law of the Russian Empire, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History (Vol. 17, No. 2, Spring 2016), pp. 333–360.
  23. ^ Etymology and definition of Putsch in German
  24. ^ Pfeifer, Wolfgang (31 January 1993). Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen [Etymological Dictionary of German language] (in German language) (second ed.). Berlin: Akademie Verlag. ISBN978-3050006260.
  25. ^ "Definition of putsch: Did you know?". Merriam Webster . Retrieved 16 Feb 2021.
  26. ^ "Röhm-Putsch" (in German). Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM), German language Historical Museum. Retrieved 26 March 2016.
  27. ^ Little-Siebold, Todd. "Cuartelazo" in Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Civilisation, vol. 2, p. 305. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1996.
  28. ^ Luttwak, Edward (1979). Coup d'État: A Applied Handbook. Harvard University Press. ISBN978-0674175471.
  29. ^ Barbara Geddes; Joseph George Wright; Joseph Wright; Erica Frantz (2018). How Dictatorships Piece of work: Power, Personalization, and Plummet. Cambridge University Press. p. 285. ISBN978-1107115828. where a monarch who had not been straight running the country (in the sense that there was a prime minister and responsible government...) decides to presume all power. Yugoslavia in 1929 was an example of this.
  30. ^ Encyclopedia Britannica: Coup d'etat [1]
  31. ^ Kevin Newton, study.com: 'Change Acquired past Revolutions, Coups & Wars' [ii]
  32. ^ David Lane: 'The Orangish Revolution: 'People'due south Revolution' or Revolutionary Coup?', The British Periodical of Politics and International Relations (BJPIR): 2008 VOL 10, 525–549 [three]
  33. ^ a b Brooks, Risa A. (xi May 2019). "Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield". Almanac Review of Political Science. 22 (1): 379–398. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407. ISSN 1094-2939.
  34. ^ "Orderly transfers of power occur less oftentimes than you lot might recall". The Economist. ISSN 0013-0613.
  35. ^ a b c d e f g h Derpanopoulos, George; Frantz, Erica; Geddes, Barbara; Wright, Joseph (1 January 2016). "Are coups good for democracy?". Research & Politics. 3 (i): 2053168016630837. doi:10.1177/2053168016630837. ISSN 2053-1680.
  36. ^ Varol, Ozan O. (20 May 2021). The Democratic Coup d'État. Oxford Academy Press. ISBN9780190626020 – via Amazon.com.
  37. ^ a b c Marinov, Nikolay; Goemans, Hein (1 October 2014). "Coups and Democracy". British Journal of Political Scientific discipline. 44 (iv): 799–825. doi:10.1017/S0007123413000264. ISSN 1469-2112. S2CID 55915744. (subscription required)
  38. ^ Miller, Michael K. (one October 2016). "Reanalysis: Are coups expert for commonwealth?". Inquiry & Politics. 3 (4): 2053168016681908. doi:10.1177/2053168016681908. ISSN 2053-1680.
  39. ^ Thyne, Clayton (25 March 2015). "The impact of coups d'état on civil war duration". Conflict Direction and Peace Science. 34 (3): 0738894215570431. doi:10.1177/0738894215570431. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 19036952.
  40. ^ a b Nordvik, Frode Martin (1 April 2019). "Does Oil Promote or Preclude Coups? The Answer is Yes". The Economic Journal. 129 (619): 1425–1456. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12604. S2CID 158738285.
  41. ^ a b Belkin, Aaron; Schofer, Evan (ane October 2003). "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47 (5): 594–620. doi:x.1177/0022002703258197. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 40848052.
  42. ^ Bong, Curtis (17 February 2016). "Coup d'État and Commonwealth". Comparative Political Studies. 49 (9): 0010414015621081. doi:10.1177/0010414015621081. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 155881388.
  43. ^ Przeworski, Adam; Alvarez, Michael E.; Cheibub, Jose Antonio; Limongi, Fernando (2000). Commonwealth and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the Earth, 1950–1990. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Republic. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521793797.
  44. ^ a b Londregan, John B.; Poole, Keith T. (1 January 1990). "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power". World Politics. 42 (2): 151–183. doi:10.2307/2010462. ISSN 1086-3338. JSTOR 2010462. (subscription required)
  45. ^ a b c d Lehoucq, Fabrice; Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal (2014). "Breaking Out of the Coup Trap". Comparative Political Studies. 47 (eight): 1105–1129. doi:10.1177/0010414013488561. S2CID 154707430.
  46. ^ Hiroi, Taeko; Omori, Sawa (1 February 2013). "Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Result History Assay". Politics & Policy. 41 (1): 39–64. doi:10.1111/polp.12001. ISSN 1747-1346.
  47. ^ Kim, Nam Kyu; Sudduth, Jun Koga (3 March 2021). "Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships". Comparative Political Studies. 54 (9): 1597–1628. doi:10.1177/0010414021997161. ISSN 0010-4140.
  48. ^ Aksoy, Deniz; Carter, David B.; Wright, Joseph (one July 2015). "Terrorism and the Fate of Dictators". World Politics. 67 (3): 423–468. doi:10.1017/S0043887115000118. ISSN 1086-3338. S2CID 154292179. (subscription required)
  49. ^ Harkness, Kristen A. (i June 2016). "The Ethnic Ground forces and the State Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 60 (4): 587–616. doi:x.1177/0022002714545332. hdl:10023/9391. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 54538341.
  50. ^ Johnson, Jaclyn; Thyne, Clayton L. (26 June 2016). "Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1951–2005". Periodical of Conflict Resolution. 62 (3): 597–625. doi:10.1177/0022002716654742. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 147707842.
  51. ^ Wig, Tore; Rød, Espen Geelmuyden (1 August 2016). "Cues to Coup Plotters Elections as Coup Triggers in Dictatorships". Journal of Disharmonize Resolution. 60 (5): 787–812. doi:x.1177/0022002714553106. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 17684023.
  52. ^ Houle, Christian (1 September 2016). "Why form inequality breeds coups just not civil wars". Journal of Peace Research. 53 (5): 680–695. doi:10.1177/0022343316652187. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 113899326.
  53. ^ Miller, Michael G.; Joseph, Michael; Ohl, Dorothy (26 May 2016). "Are Coups Really Contagious? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Political Diffusion". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (2): 410–441. doi:ten.1177/0022002716649232. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 148514914.
  54. ^ Gassebner, Martin; Gutmann, Jerg; Voigt, Stefan (one December 2016). "When to expect a insurrection d'état? An farthermost bounds assay of coup determinants". Public Selection. 169 (3–4): 293–313. doi:x.1007/s11127-016-0365-0. hdl:10419/156099. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 157580604.
  55. ^ Kinney, Drew The netherlands (2019). "Politicians at Arms: Noncombatant recruitment of soldiers for Centre East Coups". Armed services & Society. 45 (4): 681–701. doi:x.1177/0095327X18777983. ISSN 1556-0848. S2CID 149675838.
  56. ^ Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2000). "The ramble economics of autocratic succession". Public Option. 103 (ane/2): 63–84. doi:10.1023/A:1005078532251. ISSN 0048-5829. S2CID 154097838.
  57. ^ Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2004). "Autocratic succession". Encyclopedia of Public Choice. 103: 358–362. doi:x.1007/978-0-306-47828-4_39. ISBN978-0-306-47828-4.
  58. ^ Escribà-Folch, Abel; Böhmelt, Tobias; Pilster, Ulrich (ix Apr 2019). "Disciplinarian regimes and civil–armed forces relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies". Conflict Direction and Peace Science. 37 (v): 559–579. doi:ten.1177/0738894219836285. hdl:10230/46774. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 159416397.
  59. ^ Florea, Adrian (2018). "Spatial Rivalry and Coups Against Dictators" (PDF). Security Studies. 27: 1–26. doi:x.1080/09636412.2017.1360072. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 157425839.
  60. ^ Piplani, Varun; Talmadge, Caitlin (i December 2016). "When War Helps Civil–military Relations Prolonged Interstate Conflict and the Reduced Risk of Coups". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 60 (8): 1368–1394. doi:ten.1177/0022002714567950. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 3627631.
  61. ^ Arbatli, Cemal Eren; Arbatli, Ekim (2014). "External threats and political survival: Can dispute interest deter coup attempts?". Conflict Direction and Peace Science. 33 (2): 115–152. doi:10.1177/0738894214545956. S2CID 156930338.
  62. ^ White, Peter (2020). "The Perils of Peace: Civil State of war Peace Agreements and Military Coups". The Journal of Politics. 82: 104–118. doi:ten.1086/705683. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 201358683.
  63. ^ Casper, Brett Allen; Tyson, Scott A. (1 April 2014). "Popular Protestation and Elite Coordination in a Insurrection d'état". The Journal of Politics. 76 (2): 548–564. doi:10.1017/S0022381613001485. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 154715902. (subscription required)
  64. ^ Eibl, Ferdinand; Hertog, Steffen; Slater, Dan (2019). "War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide". British Journal of Political Science. 51 (3): 1–22. doi:10.1017/S0007123419000528. ISSN 0007-1234.
  65. ^ a b Lundgren, Magnus (2018). "Backdoor peacekeeping: Does participation in UN peacekeeping reduce coups at dwelling house?". Periodical of Peace Research. 55 (4): 508–523. doi:10.1177/0022343317747668. S2CID 116168984.
  66. ^ Böhmelt, Tobias; Escribà-Folch, Abel; Pilster, Ulrich (xiii August 2018). "Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Insurrection Risk" (PDF). Periodical of Conflict Resolution. 63 (5): 002200271878974. doi:ten.1177/0022002718789744. hdl:10230/46771. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 158320362.
  67. ^ a b Nordvik, Frode Martin (2019). "Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? the Answer Is Yes". The Economical Periodical. 129 (619): 1425–1456. doi:10.1111/ecoj.12604. ISSN 1468-0297. S2CID 158738285.
  68. ^ Krishnarajan, Suthan; Rørbæk, Lasse Lykke (21 Jan 2020). "The Two-sided Effect of Elections on Coup Attempts". Periodical of Conflict Resolution. 64 (7–8): 1279–1306. doi:10.1177/0022002719900001. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 212902955.
  69. ^ Powell, Jonathan; Schiel, Rebecca; Ben Hammou, Salah (2021). "Oil Wealth, Risk Credence, and the Seizure of Power". Journal of Global Security Studies. vi (4): one–eight. doi:ten.1093/jogss/ogaa053. ISSN 2057-3189.
  70. ^ T., Quinlivan, James (i January 2000). "Coup-Proofing". world wide web.rand.org . Retrieved 20 January 2016.
  71. ^ Sabaté, Oriol; Espuelas, Sergio; Herranz-Loncán, Alfonso (2021). "Military Wages and Coup d'État in Spain (1850-1915): the Use of Public Spending as a Insurrection-Proofing Strategy". Revista de Historia Economica - Periodical of Iberian and Latin American Economic History: 1–37. doi:10.1017/S0212610920000270. ISSN 0212-6109. S2CID 234382957.
  72. ^ Woldense, Josef (2022). "What Happens When Coups Neglect? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within". Comparative Political Studies. 55 (7): 1236–1265. doi:10.1177/00104140211047402. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 248921794.
  73. ^ Powell, Jonathan (1 Dec 2012). "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 56 (6): 1017–1040. doi:10.1177/0022002712445732. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 54646102.
  74. ^ Braithwaite, Jessica Maves; Sudduth, Jun Koga (i January 2016). "Military machine purges and the recurrence of civil conflict". Research & Politics. iii (1): 2053168016630730. doi:10.1177/2053168016630730. ISSN 2053-1680.
  75. ^ Talmadge, Caitlin (2015). The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Disciplinarian Regimes. Cornell Academy Printing. ISBN978-1-5017-0175-vii.
  76. ^ Talmadge, Caitlin (2016). "Dissimilar Threats, Different Militaries:Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies". Security Studies. 25 (1): 111–141. doi:10.1080/09636412.2016.1134192. ISSN 0963-6412. S2CID 3655994.
  77. ^ Narang, Vipin; Talmadge, Caitlin (31 Jan 2017). "Civil-military Pathologies and Defeat in State of war". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (7): 1379–1405. doi:10.1177/0022002716684627. S2CID 151897298.
  78. ^ Dark-brown, Cameron S.; Fariss, Christopher J.; McMahon, R. Blake (1 January 2016). "Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised War machine Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution". International Interactions. 42 (1): 1–30. doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.1046598. ISSN 0305-0629. S2CID 214653333. (subscription required)
  79. ^ Bausch, Andrew W. (2018). "Coup-proofing and Armed services Inefficiencies: An Experiment". International Interactions. 44 (ja): i–32. doi:x.1080/03050629.2017.1289938. ISSN 0305-0629. S2CID 157891333.
  80. ^ Biddle, Stephen; Zirkle, Robert (i June 1996). "Engineering science, civil‐military relations, and warfare in the developing world". Journal of Strategic Studies. 19 (ii): 171–212. doi:10.1080/01402399608437634. ISSN 0140-2390.
  81. ^ Leon, Gabriel (1 April 2014). "Soldiers or politicians? Institutions, disharmonize, and the armed services'due south part in politics". Oxford Economic Papers. 66 (2): 533–556. CiteSeerXten.1.1.grand.7058. doi:10.1093/oep/gpt024. ISSN 0030-7653.
  82. ^ Paine, Jack (2022). "Reframing The Guardianship Dilemma: How the Military's Dual Disloyalty Options Imperil Dictators". American Political Science Review: 1–xviii. doi:10.1017/S0003055422000089. ISSN 0003-0554. S2CID 247278896.
  83. ^ a b Frantz, Erica; Stein, Elizabeth A. (4 July 2016). "Countering Coups Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships". Comparative Political Studies. fifty (7): 935–962. doi:10.1177/0010414016655538. ISSN 0010-4140. S2CID 157014887.
  84. ^ "Will Turkey's insurrection endeavour prompt others nearby?". Washington Post . Retrieved 30 July 2016.
  85. ^ Böhmelt, Tobias; Ruggeri, Andrea; Pilster, Ulrich (1 April 2017). "Counterbalancing, Spatial Dependence, and Peer Group Effects*" (PDF). Political Scientific discipline Enquiry and Methods. 5 (2): 221–239. doi:ten.1017/psrm.2015.55. ISSN 2049-8470. S2CID 56130442.
  86. ^ Mehrl, Marius; Choulis, Ioannis (28 March 2021). "The colonial roots of structural coup-proofing". International Interactions. 47 (4): 750–776. doi:10.1080/03050629.2021.1898958. ISSN 0305-0629. S2CID 233642733.
  87. ^ Easton, Malcolm R.; Siverson, Randolph M. (2018). "Leader survival and purges subsequently a failed putsch". Periodical of Peace Inquiry. 55 (5): 596–608. doi:ten.1177/0022343318763713. S2CID 117585945.
  88. ^ Escribà-Folch, Abel; Böhmelt, Tobias; Pilster, Ulrich (ane September 2020). "Disciplinarian regimes and civil–armed forces relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies". Conflict Management and Peace Science. 37 (five): 559–579. doi:x.1177/0738894219836285. hdl:10230/46774. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 159416397.
  89. ^ a b c Thyne, Clayton L.; Powell, Jonathan Chiliad. (1 April 2014). "Putsch or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Touch Democratization, 1950–2008". Foreign Policy Assay: n/a. doi:ten.1111/fpa.12046. ISSN 1743-8594.
  90. ^ Powell, Jonathan M. (three July 2014). "An cess of the 'democratic' insurrection theory". African Security Review. 23 (3): 213–224. doi:10.1080/10246029.2014.926949. ISSN 1024-6029. S2CID 58937153. (subscription required)
  91. ^ Derpanopoulos, George; Frantz, Erica; Geddes, Barbara; Wright, Joseph (1 April 2017). "Are coups practiced for democracy? A response to Miller (2016)". Research & Politics. iv (two): 2053168017707355. doi:x.1177/2053168017707355. ISSN 2053-1680.
  92. ^ Lachapelle, Jean (21 November 2019). "No Easy Fashion Out: The Effect of War machine Coups on State Repression". The Journal of Politics. 82 (4): 1354–1372. doi:10.1086/707309. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 222428308.
  93. ^ Thyne, Clayton; Hitch, Kendall (2020). "Autonomous versus Authoritarian Coups: The Influence of External Actors on States' Postcoup Political Trajectories". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 64 (x): 1857–1884. doi:10.1177/0022002720935956. ISSN 0022-0027. S2CID 222111312.
  94. ^ "Is the overthrow of a democratically elected government ever justified?". The Washington Post.
  95. ^ Zack Beauchamp (16 July 2016). "Why Turkey'due south insurrection failed, according to an expert". Vocalism . Retrieved 16 July 2016.
  96. ^ "Are coups expert for republic?". Washington Mail service . Retrieved 17 July 2016.
  97. ^ "Jay Ulfelder on Twitter". 16 July 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2016.
  98. ^ Bleck, Jaimie; Michelitch, Kristin (9 May 2017). "Capturing the Airwaves, Capturing the Nation? A Field Experiment on Country-Run Media Effects in the Wake of a Coup". The Journal of Politics. 79 (iii): 873–889. doi:10.1086/690616. ISSN 0022-3816. S2CID 157667393.
  99. ^ Curtice, Travis B; Arnon, Daniel (14 May 2019). "Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights". Conflict Management and Peace Scientific discipline. 37 (6): 655–673. doi:10.1177/0738894219843240. ISSN 0738-8942. S2CID 182783295.
  100. ^ Shannon, Megan; Thyne, Clayton; Hayden, Sarah; Dugan, Amanda (i October 2015). "The International Community's Reaction to Coups". Foreign Policy Analysis. eleven (four): 363–376. doi:x.1111/fpa.12043. ISSN 1743-8594.
  101. ^ a b Soest, Christian von; Wahman, Michael (1 January 2015). "Not all dictators are equal: Coups, fraudulent elections, and the selective targeting of democratic sanctions". Journal of Peace Research. 52 (one): 17–31. doi:10.1177/0022343314551081. ISSN 0022-3433. S2CID 26945588.
  102. ^ a b Masaki, Takaaki (1 March 2016). "Coups d'État and Foreign Assistance". Globe Evolution. 79: 51–68. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.004.
  103. ^ Powell, Jonathan; Lasley, Trace; Schiel, Rebecca (7 Jan 2016). "Combating Coups d'état in Africa, 1950–2014". Studies in Comparative International Development. 51 (4): 482–502. doi:x.1007/s12116-015-9210-vi. ISSN 0039-3606. S2CID 155591291.
  104. ^ Thyne, Clayton; Powell, Jonathan; Parrott, Sarah; VanMeter, Emily (15 January 2017). "Even Generals Need Friends". Journal of Conflict Resolution. 62 (vii): 1406–1432. doi:10.1177/0022002716685611. S2CID 151393698.
  105. ^ Balima, Hippolyte Weneyam (2020). "Coups d'état and the cost of debt". Journal of Comparative Economic science. 48 (iii): 509–528. doi:10.1016/j.jce.2020.04.001. ISSN 0147-5967. S2CID 219428475.
  106. ^ "Xx Years Afterwards: The Tajik Civil War And Its Aftermath". Radio Costless Europe/Radio Freedom. 26 June 2017. Archived from the original on 8 August 2017.

Further reading [edit]

  • Luttwak, Edward (1979) Coup d'État: A Applied Handbook. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-17547-1.
  • De Bruin, Erica (2020) How to Prevent Coups d'État. Cornell University Press.
  • Schiel, R., Powell, J., & Faulkner, C. (2020). "Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018". Conflict Management and Peace Scientific discipline.
  • Singh, Naunihal. (2014) Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Armed services Coups. Johns Hopkins University Press.
  • Malaparte, Curzio (1931). Technique du Insurrection d'État (in French). Paris.
  • Finer, S.Eastward. (1962). The Human being on Horseback: The Office of the War machine in Politics. London: Pall Mall Printing. p. 98.
  • Goodspeed, D. J. (1962). Six Coups d'État. New-York: Viking Press Inc.
  • Connor, Ken; Hebditch, David (2008). How to Phase a Military Coup: From Planning to Execution. Pen and Sword Books Ltd. ISBN978-1-84832-503-6.
  • McGowan, Patrick J. (2016). "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004". Military & Society. 32: 5–23. doi:10.1177/0095327X05277885. S2CID 144318327.
  • McGowan, Patrick J. (2016). "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004". Armed Forces & Society. 32 (2): 234–253. doi:10.1177/0095327X05277886. S2CID 144602647.
  • Beeson, Mark (2008). "Civil–Military machine Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines". Military & Club. 34 (3): 474–490. doi:x.1177/0095327X07303607. S2CID 144520194.
  • n'Diaye, Boubacar (2016). "How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Command: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997". Armed forces & Order. 28 (four): 619–640. doi:x.1177/0095327X0202800406. S2CID 145783304.

External links [edit]

Coup D'etats Are Most Often,

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

Posted by: fosterfenly1938.blogspot.com

0 Response to "Coup D'etats Are Most Often"

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)

Iklan Atas Artikel

Iklan Tengah Artikel 1

Iklan Tengah Artikel 2

Iklan Bawah Artikel